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lN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
DOYLE L. A LLHED, Administrator 1 
of the Estate of James F. Allred, 
der('H~l'd, 
Plaintiff' and Appr>llant, 
-\'S,-
\·ox~\L .\LLRED and AGNES 
.\.LLR ~~D, husband and wifl', 
fll'fcndant and Res JHIIId ent, 
and 
I~ABELL ALLHED, 
Plaintiff in luterrcutio11 
and Respondent. 
I 
J 
Case 
No. 9980 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
STATE~IENT OF THE CASE 
This action was commenced by the Administrator of 
the estate of James F. Allred, deceased, to cancel and 
set aside the delivery by an escrow agent to the Respond-
ents \~onal Allred and Agnes Allred of certain instru-
ments of conYeyance and to foreclose a contract of sale 
Pntered into between James F. Allred, deceased, and his 
,,·ife, the Respondent Isabell Allred, as sellers, and the 
Respondents Yonal Allred and Agnes Allred as buyers. 
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After the action was commenced the Respondent Isabell 
Allred intervened as a plaintiff in the action, alleging 
that the delivery of the instruments of conveyance had 
been at her direction and in accordance with her agree-
ment with her deceased husband. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The lower court, upon the trial of the case, deter-
mined that the sellers under the contract, being the de-
ceased James F. Allred and the Respondent Isabell All-
red, had entered into an agreement to sell certain real 
and personal property, title to some of which ·was held 
individually by each of the sellers, and title to a portion 
of which was held by the sellers as joint tenants. The 
court concluded that the entering into of this contract 
constituted an equitable conversion of the various inter-
ests in real and personal property to an i11terest in the 
proceeds of the contract. The court further ruled that 
the deceased and his wife, the Respondent Isn bell Allred, 
had by agreement between themselves entitled "Letter of 
Instructions'' executed subsequent to the contract of sale 
(R 26, 27) created as between themselves a joillt tenancy 
in the proceeds of the sale. The court held that title to the 
right to receive these proceeds passed to the decedent's 
wife, the Respondent Isabell Allred, upon his death, and 
that accordingly the delivery of the instruments of con-
veyance to the Respondents Vonal Allred and Agnes 
Allred, was a valid delivery in accordance "Tith the agree-
ment of the parties, and dismissed the complaint of the 
plaintiff. 
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RELIIi~li, SOVO HT ON APPEAL 
rrhesc Hl•spoHdl'nts, and each of them, seek a deter-
mination by this Court that the action of the trial court 
in dismissing the complaint of the plaintiff was in ac-
('onlnm·p with the stipulated fads and the applicable law, 
and tlwt the sante be affirmed. 
ST.(\TEMENT OF FACTS 
The Respondents are in substantial agreement with 
the ~ta.tement of Facts as set out in the Brief of the Ap-
pellant. However, the Respondents differ with counsel 
f'or the .(\.ppellant in his statements that the contract was 
"delinquent'' or that it was "in default" at the time of 
the dPath of James F. Allred. The court found (Tr. 86, 
L. 16, ~-l; Tr. 87, L. 21) that there was $1,000 "due" (Tr. 
86) or "due, owing and un,paid" (Tr. 87). Further the 
Respondent Isabell Allred, in answer to the interroga-
toril's of the Appellant (R 44) stated that the Respond-
ent~ Yonal Allred and Agnes Allred had paid to the Re-
~pondent Isn bell Allred and her husband or had applied 
for their benefit the total sum of $3,059.02. She further 
stated that she had acquitted the balance of the purchase 
price in return for an agreement for her support, made· 
~nh~Pquent to the death of her husband. This state-
ment was not contradicted or rebutted by the introduc-
tion of any contrary or conflicting evidence, and under 
the circumstances, it would appear that use of the words 
delinquent and default imply more than a finding that 
tlwrr was an amount of $1,000 due or due, ozcing and un-
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paid. Further, counsel for the Appellant refers to the 
delivery of the instruments of conveyance as a ''gift.'' 
While it is the contention of the Respondents and each of 
them, that the Respondent Isabell Allred, had the right 
to make such a gift if she so chose, the only evidence in 
the record or the pleadings (R 44) relating to this aspect 
of the conveyance negates a gift. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT ONE 
THE COURT PROPERLY APPLIED THE 
DOCTRINE OF EQUITABLE CONVERSION. 
Appellant contends that the deceased, James F. All-
red, did not intend a gift to the Respondents Vonal Allred 
and Agnes Allred. The Respondents each would agree 
with this statement and point out that he did not, in fact, 
make a gift to these Respondents, but created a joint 
tenancy whereby the survivor of he and his wife would be 
the sole owner of all the property owned by each and both 
of them. By reason of this agreement and her husband's 
death, Respondent Isabell Allred became the sole owner 
of the property to dispose of it as she deemed fit. Coun-
sel assails the application of the doctrine of equitable 
conversion in this instance as ''repugnant to fundamen-
tal concepts of equity,'' and deplores the application of 
the doctrine "to accomplish such inequitable results." 
Just what inequities exist in a situation where a husband 
and wife so arrange their affairs that the surYivor of 
them will be the sole owner of all of the property of both 
4 
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of them is difficult to see, and .Appellant, after observing 
the inequities, does little to enlighten his reader as to 
what they consist of. Apparently, however, it is con-
~idPred more equitable to give to the widow of the de-
et>dPnt one-third of his property, and to divide two-thirds 
nmong his children, all of whom are grown and pre-
sumably self-supporting, and this notwithstanding the 
fact that the a.greement signed by the deceased and hi~ 
wife (R ~7) provides that the purchasers shall pay "to 
n:-; or the s1trriuor of us the sum of $17,000.00." 
It is the position of the Respondents that, upon en-
tering into the agreement of sale between the deceased, 
,Jnmes F. Allred, and his wife, the Respondent Isabell 
.\llred, as sellers, and the Respondents Vonal Allred and 
.\g-nt~:'i .Allred, as buyers, that an equitable conversion 
was efferted, and that the interests of the vendors in 
the real and personal properties subject of the sale be-
came an interest in the proceeds of the contract of sale. 
At 19 Am . .Jur., P. 3, Para. 3, it is stated: 
"It is well established that money directed to be 
employed in the purchase of land, or land directed 
to be sold and turned into money, is to be consid-
ered in that species of property into which it is 
directed to be converted, regardless of the manner 
in which direction is given. Whether money is 
actually deposited or is only covenanted to be paid, 
whether land is actually conveyed or only agreed 
to be conveyed, the owner of the fund or property, 
or the contracting parties, may make the land 
money or the money land.'' 
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See also 19 Am. Jur. 11, Para. 11, wherein it is stateu: 
''Equitable conversion may be produced hy a ron-
tractual obligation to exchange real estate for per-
sonalty, or personalty for real estate. In genrral, 
it is only necessary that the contract be enforre-
able. Thus, an executory contract for the sale of 
land works a conversion, since equity regardH 
'things agreed to be done as actually performed' 
and treats the vendor as holding the land in trust 
for the purchaser and the purchaser as a trustee 
of the purchase price to the vendor. The vendee 
is, in the contemplation of equity, actually seised 
of the estate ... Enforceability at the time of 
death of one of the parties refers to the validity of 
the contract, and not to conditions which may not 
have been performed because performance there-
of was not due at the time of the death of the 
testator. It is sufficient if these conditions can be 
performed by the testator's representative. Where 
a contract for the sale of land might have been 
enforced against the vendor if he had lived, the 
conversion from realty into personalty may be 
completed, even though the vendee has not paid 
the purchase price, and the contract is executory 
in character.'' 
See further, 19 Am. Jur., P. 15, Para. 15, where it is 
stated: 
''A contract for the sale of land operates as an 
equitable conversion; the vendee takes an equi-
table title, and his interest under the contract be-
comes realty ... (P. 16). The vendor holds the 
legal title as trustee for the purchaser and as se-
curity for the payment of the purchase money." 
See Hewitt v. Biege (Kan. 1958), 327 Pac. 2nd 872, a case 
very similar to the instant case. See also In re Bakers 
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Estaft·, 7H X.\r. ~nd 863, Annotated at 64 A.L.H. ~JI(l 902. 
'rlw Court in this casp applied the doctrine of equitable 
('om·prsion and held that the owners of the real property 
terminated a joint tennney in the real property and creat-
ed a tPHPnnry in common in the right to receiYe the pro-
reeds thrrefrom, by the execution of a contract of sale. 
Hmn'vPr, it will be noted that in the Baker case, the trial 
<"onrt spPeitirally found that there was no intent to create 
n joint tt>nn11ry in the proceeds of the sale, and conse-
quently they were deemed to be held in common. 
It should also be noted that counsel for the Appellant, 
in his ~[ Pmorandum of Authorities submitted to the trial 
rourt in opposition to the Motion for Summary Judgment 
of the Plaintiff in Intervention, the Respondent Isabell 
Allred, stated as follows: 
•' I firmly believe that the law in Utah, although 
there are no Utah Supreme Court decisions that I 
can find on a contract of sale, that there is a equi-
table conversion and a joint tenancy in real prop-
erty is terminated and the proceeds of the sale 
is held as personal property. Since Utah does fol-
low the doctrine of equitable conversion, the 
Baker Y. Cobb case, 78 N.W. 2nd 863, would set a 
precedent for the law in Utah. Since counsel 
acknowledges that there is a equitable conversion, 
I shall not go into any further detail in that por-
tion of the memorandum.'' 
Further, on Page 4 of his 1\femorandum, counsel stated 
as follows: 
•' This equitable conversion of the real and per-
sonal property into a contract right took place on 
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1\Iay 27, 1958, four days before the letter of escrow 
instructions were signed.'' 
Further, at the pretrial hearing of this matter held Feb-
ruary 18, 1963, the court inquired of counsel for the 
Appellant as to his position on the issue of equitable 
conversion (Tr. 32, L. 18 to Tr. 33, L. 10, incl.). At this 
time there appeared to he no dispute between the parties 
as to the application of the doctrine. 
At the trial of this matter, held April 29, 1963, coun-
sel for the Appellant stated in the course of the proceed-
ings (Tr. 47, L. 23): 
"All right. Now our position is that the agree-
ment of sale dated May 27, 1958, is controlling 
and that determines the ownership of the re-
maining balance under this contract ... " 
Further, at the time of the argument upon Appel-
lant's Motion for a New Trial and to Amend (Tr. 72, 
L. 3) counsel stated: 
"Our position then and still is that there was 
created here a tenancy in common, and this latter 
agreement of May 31, was not sufficient to create 
a joint tenancy as claimed by the defendants, the 
plaintiff in intervention.'' 
And again counsel stated his position as follo"'S (Tr. 73, 
L. 3): 
''Our position at the time of the trial was and still 
is that this agreement of May 27, which was the 
contract of sale between Mr. and Mrs. James F. 
Allred and Vonal Allred and his wife, created 
a tenancy in common in this property .... " 
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Thu~ it would appear that Appellant has not only raised 
tlw issue of the application of the doctrine of equitable 
(•onversion for the first time on appeal, but has, in fad, 
completely reversed the position taken by him before, 
during and after the trial of this action. 
POINT TWO 
THE COURT PROPERLY DETERMINED 
THAT THE LETTER OF ESCROW IN-
STRUCTIONS CREATED A JOINT TEN-
ANCY. 
Following the execution of the contract of sale on 
\fny 27, 1958, the sellers executed a "Letter of Instruc-
tions'' which provided as follows (R. 26, 27) : 
The undersigned hereby deliver to you, the papers 
and instructions hereinafter described to be held 
and disposed of by you only in accordance with 
the following instructions hereinafter set forth, to 
which the undersigned irrevocably agree: 
----------------··········------(Description of documents held 
iu escrow.) 
1. You shall make delivery to the purchaser of 
all of the papers and documents hereinabove 
enumerated, if, as, and when said purchasers 
shall haYe paid to us or the survivor of usr the 
sum of $17,000.00. 
2. In the event said purchaser shall fail to pay 
any of the installments provided for in that 
certain agreement bearing date of the 27th 
day of May, A.D., 1958, promptly and when 
due, then upon our written demand, you shall 
return to us all of said papers and documents, 
whereupon your duties, responsibilities and 
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liabilities of every kind and character under 
the terms of this escrow shall cease and 
terminate. 
3. In the event both of us shall depart this life 
during the term of this contract, then upon. 
satisfa,ctory proof being made to you that both 
of us are deceased all payments thereafter rlue 
are to be abated and you are to make delivery 
to the purchasers, all of the said papers and 
instruments as though the purchase price had 
been paid in full. 
4. This escrow is not assignable. 
(italics added) 
It is the contention of the Respondents that the parties 
to this agreement, the decedent and his wife, the Re-
spondent Isabell Allred, by its execution created a joint 
tenancy between themselves in the subject matter of the 
contract of sale. 
Respondents would agree that the statutory pre-
sumption, in the absence of a contrary intent being shown, 
is that a tenancy in common is presumed. It seems clear 
that historically, the common law favored joint tenan-
cies; that with the passing of the feudal system, joint 
tenancies came into disfavor, and that the result has been 
various statutory enactments with regard to joint ten-
ancies. These various statutes may prohibit, modify or 
limit the estate of joint tenancy, or they may merely 
change the common law presumption of a joint tenancy 
to a statutory presumption of tenancy in common. See 
Thompson on Real Property, Paragraph 172, Volume 4, 
Page 36 (1961 Replacement Volume). The Utah Statute, 
10 
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heiu~ .-,7 -1-.\ l "tah Codt> Annotated 1!).);~, as amended 
by lnws of 19.-,::, ( 1haptl•r !):~,Paragraph 1, is of the latter 
ty}H', raising- a pn•snmption of tenancy in common, where 
not expressed otlwrwisc. By the amendment of 1953, to 
tlw prior general statement of presumption, there was 
addt•d tlw elarifying statement: 
"lT sP of the words 'joint tenaney' or 'with rights 
of survivorship,' or' and to the surz:ivor of them,' 
or words of similar import shall decla.re a joint 
fc11a Jl<'.'f·" (italics added) 
Thus it would appear that the legislative intent was to 
more rlearly define the manner of creation of a joint ten-
anry hy the use of certain wording, which under the 
~ta tutc "shall declare a joint tenancy," making the crea-
tion of a joint tenancy a matter of law when the pre-
scribed wording is employed. See First Security Bank of 
Ctah v. Burgi, 122 Utah 455, 251 Pac. 2nd 297, at Page 
301, where the court states : 
"vVhere an intention to create a joint account is 
elearly expressed in a written contract executed 
by the parties, which remains unaltered and there 
is no evidence of fraud, undue influence, mistake, 
or other infirmity, the question of intention ceases 
to be an issue and the courts are bound by the 
agreement. '' 
sl)(l also Holt Y. Bayles, 85 Utah 364, 39 Pac. 2nd 715 and 
casl)S therein cited. 
It would seem clear that the property rights of the 
sl•!krs under the contract, that is, the right to receive 
the consideration under the contract, is a property inter-
est which may properly be held in joint tenancy, if the 
11 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
parties so intend. See In re Bakers Estate, and H e1ritt 
v. Biege, heretofore cited, and sell also 14 Am. Jur. Page 
81, Paragraph 10, wherein it is recited: 
"It became settled at an early date that a ten-
ancy of such character can exist in any kind of 
property that is susceptible of being possessed in 
severalty.'' 
The presumption arising under the Statute (57-1-5) 
applies to an interest in real property and makes no ref-
erence to any presumption as to a joint tenancy in per-
sonalty. In this connection it seems pertinent to observp 
that Utah is one of the four of the United States which 
has adopted the l\iodel Interparty Agreement Act (15-3-1 
to 4, U.C.A. 1953). While this act has not been construed 
by the Utah Supreme Court, it appears that it would 
have some application in the instant case. See /11 Re 
V andergrifts Estate, 161 At. 898 (Pa. 1932), wherein this 
act is construed as authorizing the wife, as a sole tenant, 
to create by an appropriate conveyance, a tenancy by the 
entirety in herself and her husband. 
As to the unities rule, it will be recalled that prior 
to 1953, attorneys generally felt that to obtain a strict 
compliance with the unities rule, a '' strawman'' was nec-
essary, ''thereby the parties would convey their separate 
interest to a third part~T' and the third party would then 
~y r..eeeveey to the parties as joint tenants. The question of 
the necessity of this procedure was dispensed with by 
the amendments of 57-1-5 U.C.A. 1953 by the laws of 
1953, Chapter 93, Paragraph 1. Further, the property 
suhjcd of the joint tenancy is not the individual items of 
12 
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real and personal property, lmt is the right to receive the 
proceeds of the sale. As to this right, the unities of time, 
interest, title and possession are present by reason of 
the l'quitable conversion effected by the entering into of 
t:hr co11trad of Hale. 
Appellants, of necessity, characterize the "Letter of 
Instructions'' entered into between the deceased and his 
wi fp, as merely instructions to a third party without an~~ 
probative value in indicating the true relationship in-
tended between the parties. It is submitted that the Let-
ter of Instructions is a contract between :\fr. and ~Irs . 
. \lln•d, to which they, as the signers, "irrevocably agree" 
(R. ~fi). The parties to the escrow agreement, by its exe-
rution, were not only complying with their agreement 
under the contract of sale, but in addition were contract-
ing })('tween themselves, in plain and unadorned language, 
free of ambiguity and in strict compliance with the statu-
tory requirements. Appellant conjectures at length as to 
the intent of the parties. Applying the theory of Appel-
lant and ignoring the use of the words ''or to the sur-
,·ivor of us,'' or at the most limiting them to making the 
survivor a mere agent for the estate of the deceased, 
Appellant would urge that the parties intended that on 
the death of one, his or her estate would be distributed 
under the laws of intestate, descent, one-third to the sur-
vivor of them and two-thirds equally among their children, 
hut the payment of the two-thirds to his children would 
abate in favor of the Respondent Vonal )dlred, when the 
surviving spouse died. Stated another way, are the docu-
ments susceptible of a construction that, even though 
~Ir. Allred intended that his surviving widow should re-
13 
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ceive, by the laws of intestate succession, only one-third 
of his portion of the proceeds of the contract, and that his 
surviving children should receive in equal shares two-
thirds during her lifetime, that nevertheless, upon his 
widow's death, the payments abated completPl,\', even 
though the stU\'iYing spouse \Yas receiving only one-
third of them~ And taking this argument one step fur-
ther, how could the claimed interest of the Appellant 
possibly be computed, inasmuch as Isabell Allred is still 
living, and there is no way of determining \Yhether she 
will live for the entire term of the sale agreement, and 
therefore, no way of determining when the remainder of 
the payments due under the sale agreement might abate. 
Further, if the Appellant's theory is correct, and theRe-
spondent Isabell Allred, under the escrow agreement, is 
merely an agent for the collection of the sums due under 
the contract, of '''hich she has acknowledged receipt from 
the buyers, is not the remedy of the Appellant an action 
for an accounting by the Respondent Isabell Allred as to 
the payments received by her~ It is submitted that the 
construction of the escrow instructions urged h.'' thr 
Appellant lead necessarily to ridiculous results. It would 
seem evident from a reading of the documents in evi-
dence that both James and Isabell Allred, the vendors 
under the contract, desired that they be provided for hy 
the purchasers, the Respondents Vonal and Agnes Allred 
during their lifetime from the proceeds of the sale, that 
upon the death of one of them, the survivor would con-
tinue to be so provided for, as she is, and that upon thr 
death of the surYivor the obligations of the purchasers 
n11drr the contract \Yerr at an end. 
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POINT THREE 
THAT rrHE .\ PPELLANrr FAILED TO ~IEET 
THE BURDEN OF PROOF IMPOSED UPON 
HI:\J l~ TH.\T HE FAILED TO REBUT THE 
PRESU~IPTION OF JOINT TENANCY . 
• \ t the trial of this action ( Tr. 44 to 52 incl.), the con-
tract of sale ( R ~1-25), the Letter of Instructions ( R 26, 
~7) and the Release of Escrow (R. 28, 29) were admitted 
in ('Videll('e upon the stipulation of the parties. After 
dis('ussiou of certain procedural stipulations, counsel 
for the plaintiff rested (Tr. 52, L. 18) without calling any 
witnesses. After further discussion counsel for the de-
fendant and for the plaintiff in intervention, the Re-
spondents herein advised the court (Tr. 56, L. 18, 25) 
that upon the present state of the record, each rested. The 
eonrt, at this stage of the proceedings (Tr. 56, L. 28) 
addressed counsel for the plaintiff as follows : 
''THE CouRT : So if I, and I am doing this to clar-
ify the record so that we won't have any misun-
derstanding. You now rest, Mr. Frandsen t 
''.:\In. FRANDSEN: Yes, sir. 
''THE CouRT : And there is no further evidence 
you desire to offer¥ 
":Jin. FRANDSEN : That is right." 
.Appellant called no witnesses nor made any attempt by 
testimony to rebut the presumption of joint tenancy 
raised hy the use of the language of the Letter of In-
structions, though all of the parties to the agreement then 
liYing, as well as the attorney who prepared the agree-
ments, were present in court. This court has repeatedly 
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held that the burden of rebutting the presumption of 
joint tenancy, once the same is established by the use of 
the appropriate language, is upon the party denying the 
existence of the joint tenancy. See Braegger Y. Lovelrnlff, 
12 Utah 2nd 384, 367 Pac. 2nd 177, wherein the rule is 
stated as follows: 
"In making such appraisal, it should be kept in 
mind initiall~", that the burden was not upon the 
defendant to make an affirmative showing of such 
intent. As the survivor, she was presumed to he 
the owner and the burden of attacking her owner-
ship 'vas upon the plaintiff administrator." 
See also I-I olt v. Bayes, heretofore cited. 
POINT FOUR 
THE COURT PROPERLY RULED THAT THE 
LETTER OF ESCROW INSTRUCTIONS DID 
NOT CONSTITUTE AN ATTE~1:PTED TES-
TAMENTARY DISPOSITIOX OF PROPERTY. 
Counsel for the Appellant bases the first part of his 
argument on this point on the premise that the contract 
was delinquent, and that the court so found. If the words 
delinquent and default as used by the Appellant are syn-
onymous with the words due or due, owing a11d unpaid as 
found by the court (Tr. 86, L. 16, 24; Tr. 87, L. 21) the 
premise is a correct statement, but if these words are not 
synonymous, Appellant's basic premise is in error. 
See Gammon Y. Bunnell, 22 Utah 421, 64 Par. 958, 
wherein the plaintiff alleged in his complaint that the de-
ceased, for consideration, had executed a deed and plarrd 
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t hl' same in escrow, the escrow directing the holder, upon 
the death of the grantor, and upon proof that the plaintiff 
had paid to one ~[artha Anne Gammon $300 in gold 
coin, to delin.'r the deed to the plaintiff. The plaintiff 
nlleged that he had performed all of the conditions of the 
Pscrow, had tendered the $300, which had been refused 
and which was tendered into court, and demanded deliY-
<'l'Y of the deed. The defendant's demurrer to the com-
plaint was sustained by the trial court, and the plaintiff 
appealed. The Supreme Court of Utah reversed, holding 
that the facts alleged in the complaint were admitted by 
the demurrer, and that plaintiff was entitled to judgment 
as a matter of law. The court, in arriving at its decision, 
comments (Page 959, Pac.) : 
''The purpose of the escrow having been accom-
plished, the plaintiff held the deed in the same 
manner as he would have held it had it been de-
livered to him in the first instance. The intention 
was that it should be the deed of the grantee when 
the condition was complied with, and when com-
plied \Yith, it would take effect from its first deliY-
ery.'' (Citing numerous authorities) 
The Court refers in its opinion to Section 3935, Revised 
Statutes 1898, which is presently 75-11-26, Utah Code 
Annotated 1953. See also 19 Am. Jur., Page 423, Para-
graph 7, \vherein it is stated: 
"In some cases the deed is deposited with a third 
person to be delivered over to the grantee named 
on the happening of a contingency, such as the 
death of the grantor, plus the fulfillment of a 
condition, such as the grantee taking care of the 
grantor during the grantor's lifetime ; and if it is 
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neeeessary to effectuate the deed that it be con-
sidered a present delivery of a present interest, it 
will be so considered.'' 
See also 19 Am. Jur. 448, Para, 27, wherein it is stated: 
"The death of the grantor ·while his deed is held 
in escrow does not invalidate the instrument upon 
its subsequent delivery." 
These principals are clearly distinguishable from the 
theory of an attempted testamentary disposition, as was 
the case in First Security Banlc of Utah Y. Burgi, hPre-
tofore cited. 
CONCLUSION 
The Respondents submit that the trial court cor-
rectly held, upon the evidence, that the deceased anrl his 
wife, the Respondent Isabell Allred, effected an equitable 
conversion of their respecti>:e interests in the Yarious real 
and personal property subject of the contract of sale, 
converting the same into the right to receive proceeds 
of the sale; that the deceased and his wife thereafter, by 
their mutual agreement contained in the Letter of In-
structions to which each of them "irrevocably agreed" 
and by a provision that the purchasers shall haYc paid 
"to us or to the survivor of us" the purchase price creat-
ed a joint tenancy between themselves; and that upon 
the death of James F. Allred the property subject of the 
contract became the separate property of the Respondent 
Isabell Allred. Further, that the Appellant completely 
failed to introduce any evidence of a contrary intent or 
to rebut in any manner the presumption of joint tenancy 
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raised by the agreement of the parties. Accordingly, the 
ruling of the trial court, declaring the property to he the 
sole property of the Respondent Isabell Allred on the 
dC'ath of her husband and dismissing the complaint of 
the Appellant, ~hould be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
LEE W. HOBBS 
Continental Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
A. JOHN RUGGERI 
Carbon County Court House 
Price, Utah 
Attorneys for Respondents 
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